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Consensual Modifications of the Rules
of Evidence: The Limits of Party
Autonomy in an Adversary System
The invitation to deliver a lecture sponsored by the Order of the
Coifl came at a particularly opportune time for me, as it afforded the
opportunity to organize my thoughts on some issues which, though
long recognized 2 and of some importance, 3 have never received ade-
quate systematic analysis either by the courts4 or the commentators. 5
The title I have chosen for my efforts in this direction is Consensual
Modifications of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party Autonomy
in an Adversary System,
I start from the proposition, well known to all those trained in the
Anglo-American legal tradition, that we have an adversary system,
which is quite different from those employed in much of the non-En-
glish speaking world. 6 The distinctiveness of the adversary system, as
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
Rosenstiel Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of Arizona. He is the
general editor and a contributing author of McCoRIuCK ON EVIDENCE (5th ed.,
1999). He previously served the University of Nebraska as Dean of the College of
Law (1977-1982) and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (1981-1984).
1. This writing is a slightly modified and annotated version of a lecture by the same
title sponsored by the Order of the Coif and delivered November 6, 2000, at the
University of Nebraska College of Law. The author wishes to thank the Order of
the Coif for its support.
2. See, e.g., Gold v. Death, 79 Eng. Rep. 325 (K-B. 1616).
3. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
4. "[Jludicial opinion in modem times has treated some sorts of stipulations with
suspicion and disparagement, while giving sanction to others; and different
courts have taken opposite views of the same type of transaction. Variant reason-
ing has been put forth to justify these inconsistent rulings. No general survey of
the problem of stipulations seems to have been taken." 1 JoHN HENRY WmioRE,
EVIDENCE § 7a, at 563 (Peter Tillers ed. 1983).
5. Wigmore appears to be the only major commentator to give the question extended
treatment. See id. § 7a. For other brief but helpful sources, see 21 CHARLEs ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHANi, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (1st
ed. 1977 & Supp. 2001); Note, Judicial Admissions, 64 CoLui. L. REV. 1121
(1964); Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HAav. L. REv. 138
(1932).
6. See Mijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973).
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its name would suggest, lies in its allocation to the adversaries in the
dispute the basic responsibility for discovering, marshalling, and
presenting the facts of the case to the decision maker, either judge or
jury, rather than assigning these tasks to a non-partisan official. Es-
sentially two complementary justifications have been presented for
this mode of proceeding. First, the adversary system is a sort of ana-
log of laissez-faire economics, 7 in the sense that, as according to Adam
Smith, individual pursuit of personal economic advantage will ulti-
mately redound to the general public benefit. This places the burden
of fact development and presentation upon those most interested in
the result and will tend to ensure the fullest and ultimately most accu-
rate depiction of the facts. A second justification sometimes asserted
is that this allocation of responsibility is essentially fair, in the sense
that those most immediately affected by judicial decisions should be
given every reasonable opportunity to participate in the resolution
process.8
Consistent with these rationales, parties to litigation are, for the
most part, given great latitude in the manner in which they choose to
assert their rights in court. This autonomy is slightly less in criminal
matters,9 where it is said that the state possesses a significant inter-
est. But even here, the overriding interest in allowing self-determina-
tion will often prevail even to the extent of allowing the criminal
defendant to make choices which would generally be thought to be un-
desirable and even foolish.1o
Not surprisingly, the rules of evidence, which are themselves part
and parcel of the adversary system,"1 generally also operate upon the
7. "'Classical' laissez-faire economic theory assumed that, when each individual, as
an 'economic man,' strives rationally, in the competitive economic struggle ... to
promote his own self-interest, we attain public welfare through the wisest use of
resources and the most socially desirable distribution of economic goods. The
'fight' theory ofjustice is a sort of legal laissez-faire." JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL 92 (1949). Judge Frank, of course, proceeds to argue that total reliance
upon adversarial discretion is unwise, a position consistent with the thesis ad-
vanced here.
8. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2, at 5 (2d ed., 1965).
9. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942) ("[Ihe proper administra-
tion of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties"); State
v. Tangalin, 657 P.2d 1025, 26 (Haw. 1983) ("[M]atters affecting the public inter-
est cannot be made the subject of stipulation so as to control the court's action
.... Criminal cases are per se matters affecting the public interest... ." (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
10. An outstanding example is the constitutional right to represent oneself in a crimi-
nal proceeding established in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The
holding is criticized by Justice Blackmun in dissent as conferring on the defen-
dant "a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself." Id. at 852 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
11. Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JuaIs. 279 (1996)
("Every system of adjudication resting upon the Anglo-American legal tradition
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principle of party responsibility. By that I mean it is usually the re-
sponsibility of the parties to see that the rules are applied. This re-
sponsibility is most clearly embodied in the so-called
contemporaneous objection rule, which requires the party wishing to
see a rule of evidence enforced to lodge an objection as soon as an im-
pending violation of the rule is reasonably to be anticipated.12 Failure
to make an objection will, in the great majority of instances, mean
that the rule goes unenforced at trial. In addition, such a violation of
the rule will provide no ground for claiming error on appeal.13 In
other words, the usual result is that any rule not insisted upon by a
party wishing to see it applied is waived.
And, of course, in addition to waiver, there are several other ave-
nues by which the parties may forego enforcement of the usual rules.
Foremost among these are pre-dispute contracts in which the parties
specify what rules will apply in the event a dispute develops between
them,1 4 and stipulations, which will sometimes constitute an agreed
modification of the rules or represent mutual acceptance of a fact
which otherwise would need to be established by ordinary evidentiary
means.15
Now, given the great deference to party autonomy within the ad-
versary system, it might seem almost axiomatic that whenever all
parties agree that a particular rule of evidence shall not be enforced
that will be the end of the matter. In reality, however, the matter is
not so simple nor the answer so obvious. For, despite the fact that the
issue has been mooted for over 400 years, no clear resolution of it has
ever emerged.
Several reasons can be advanced as to why a renewed considera-
tion of the question is warranted. Wigmore, the only commentator to
address the matter in any detail, recommended its further considera-
tion, among other reasons, as a remedy for the long-standing confu-
sion of authority on the question. Clarification will in turn serve to
more fully advise the parties to litigation on exactly how far they may
consensually modify the rules,16 and the trial courts as to what limita-
contains a framework of rules, principles, and doctrines which governs the admis-
sion... of evidence.").
12. 1 McCoRuCK ON EVIDENCE § 52, at 220-221 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
13. FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
14. See 1 WMoRE, supra note 4, § 7a (voluminous collection of such cases).
15. Alteration of a rule by pre-dispute contract differs from alteration by waiver or
stipulation in that the latter take place in a judicially supervised context and
thus may be thought relatively immune from the types of infirmities discussed in
the text infra at note 21. But with respect to examination of the policies limiting
party autonomy, the specific mechanism by which party agreement is expressed
is largely immaterial. See Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46
HAv. L. REV. 138, 139 (treating "stipulations and contracts" in pari materia).
16. Agreements to modify evidentiary rules may stem from an extensive variety of
concerns. See, e.g., John M. Kobayashi, Too Little, Too Late: Use and Abuse of
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tions are properly to be imposed on such attempted exercises of party
autonomy. 17 Finally, a consideration of whether party autonomy is
ever properly to be constrained in this context may provide some valu-
able and more general cautionary lessons concerning the types of val-
ues and interests which may be threatened by the untrammeled
operation of the adversary system.
Unfortunately, the confusion of precedent noted by Wigmore in
1940 still persists.1 8 A seeming majority of courts have now retreated
from the position, earlier common, that the parties are powerless to
affect the rules by consensual agreement. 19 The prevalent view today,
by contrast, is that while the parties have wide latitude in modifying
the rules for their mutual purposes, they are nonetheless constrained
in this by limitations of public policy. 20 No systematic investigation of
what sorts of policies will be viewed to have this effect has come to my
attention. While it is no doubt impossible, and even undesirable, to
attempt to collate an exhaustive list of public policy prohibitions in
this regard, it would nevertheless seem appropriate to arrive at some
clearer definition of the types of interests likely to be impinged upon
by unimpeded party autonomy.
Innocuous Yet Dangerous Evidentiary Doctrines, C607 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COuRsE OF
STUDY 1127, 1141 (1991) ("Stipulations to admit or exclude evidence and con-
tracts to exclude evidence are evidentiary and procedural techniques that will, in
the author's opinion, become increasingly important in mass tort and multi-juris-
dictional actions.").
17. As reflecting the trial courts' need for such clarification, see Estate of Burson, 124
Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (Ct. App. 1975) ("A court is free to disregard a stipulation only
if it is 'illegal' or 'contrary to public policy.'") and Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District v. Bar Forty Seven Co., 579 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1978) (finding error for
trial court to refuse effect to stipulation without providing reason).
18. "Wigmore's hopes for a systematic exposition of the subject of agreements to vary
rules of evidence have not been realized. The subject is rarely discussed in the
scholarly literature, and the little discussion that exists is quite limited in scope."
See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 7a, at 577.
19. The attitude prevalent earlier is well reflected in the frequently cited case of
American Benefit Life Ass'n v. Hall, 185 N.E. 344, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1933) ("It is
far better for the courts to make the rules for all cases, as it is only by such
method that any uniformity can be attained and any degree of certainty as-
sured."). This view continues to find expression in some recent cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Downey, 2 P.3d 191, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("The parties ... are pre-
cluded from devising their own rules of evidence.").
20. 1 WiMoRE, supra note 4, § 7a, at 577 ("[Tjhe courts still largely content them-
selves with speaking in a conclusory way of the limitations imposed by 'public
policy' and the inability of the parties to make 'unreasonable' agreements.").
Cases of this sort are legion. See, e.g., Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279-80
(Colo. 1986) ("[Plarties may stipulate away valuable rights, provided the court is
not required to abrogate inviolate rights of public policy."); Kraker v. Roll, 474
N.Y.S.2d 527, 535 (App. Div. 1984) ("[With a stipulation parties can chart their




Before attempting to identify the principal policies which may
place limits on the parties' ability to modify the rules of evidence, it is
helpful to distinguish between cases in which the parties have under-
standingly concurred in an alteration of the rules, and cases in which
an agreement has apparently been reached, but only because one
party has been imposed upon by another or has acquiesced in a viola-
tion of the rules through ignorance or ineptitude. Imposition, igno-
rance, and ineptitude are old familiars of the law, and here as
elsewhere the law has developed procedures to prevent their intrusion
where possible, and to remedy their consequences when they ap-
pear.21 For example, failure through ineptitude to satisfy the contem-
poraneous objection rule which I mentioned earlier can, in extreme
cases, be salvaged through operation of the doctrine of plain error.
2 2
This doctrine allows an appellate court to recognize and remedy a vio-
lation of the rules of evidence even though no contemporaneous objec-
tion was made. 23
All too frequently, however, cases properly calling for treatment as
instances of party overreaching have mistakenly been classified as ex-
amples of attempted party modification of the rules of evidence. Be-
cause this type of case has arisen with some frequency and has caused
some unfortunate confusion, I will take the time to offer a brief expla-
nation. The insurance cases offer the best example of an agreement
which veils what is properly a question of substantive law in the guise
of an agreement to modify the rules of evidence. In a variety of insur-
ance contracts, the insurer seeks to limit the scope of the risk insured
against by providing that proof of loss must be made by, and only by,
certain types of proof.24 For example, a policy of burglary insurance
might provide that there must be physical evidence of forcible entry
before coverage is afforded. Since burglary might quite conceivably be
proved in a variety of other ways, such a provision invites classifica-
tion as an attempt to modify the ordinary rules of relevancy.
21. United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a court
may relieve a party from the effect of a stipulation on basis that it was obtained
by fraud or was the product of mistake or inadvertence).
22. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE § 1.8, at 29 ("The plain error principle
is best understood as a device for mitigating the harshness of the adversary sys-
tem ..... ).
23. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) (noting that plain error "tempers
... a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection requirement.").
24. Note, supra note 15, at 141 ("Accident insurance policies frequently provide that
the insurer shall not be liable in the event of death or injury from the discharge of
firearms unless the accidental cause shall be established by the testimony of an
eyewitness other than the insured or claimant. Similarly, life insurance policies
attempt to avoid the seven year presumption of death by providing that disap-
pearance alone shall not constitute proof of decease of the insured."). Such provi-
sions can be, and frequently are, drafted as "coverage" provisions.
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In reality, however, these agreements are best viewed not as con-
tracts to stipulate different rules of evidence, but as problematic in-
surance contracts which require interpretation in light of the
reasonable expectations of the insured. Thus, the ultimate question to
be resolved in applying such a provision, as in the burglary policy ex-
ample, is whether the reasonable expectations of a purchaser of "bur-
glary" insurance are met by a policy which actually limits recovery to
burglaries accomplished by external forced entry which leaves physi-
cal traces. If this is viewed as a reasonable definition of coverage,
then it is inaccurate to say that the parties are, by their agreement,
forcing the court to apply a limitation of relevancy which contravenes
logic and good sense. For it does not require the perceptiveness of a
Yogi Berra to discern that a burglary leaving physical signs of forced
entry can only be proved by adducing evidence that there were physi-
cal signs of a forced entry. On the other hand, if it is viewed as over-
reaching to sell an insured something called a burglary policy which
covers only burglaries leaving particular kinds of evidence, then the
court should construe the contract to afford a broader coverage which
accords with the reasonable expectations of the insured.2 5
Clearly the law should, through the use of both substantive and
evidentiary doctrines, attempt to prevent the sacrifice of significant
rights through either overreaching by the opponent or excusable igno-
rance of a party. It should even, in extreme cases, attempt to set aside
the results of such misadventures when they do occur. But the ques-
tion remains, what should be the attitude of the law toward the modi-
fication of evidentiary rules which are understandingly and mutually
desired by the parties?
As I previously noted, this question has received widely differing
responses. Today, though a contrariety of statements can still be
found, the most common judicial formulation is that the parties are
allowed wide discretion in determining what rules of evidence are to
be enforced in a judicial proceeding, but may not by party agreement
violate public policy.2 6 Beyond this very general statement, the deci-
sions give only sketchy suggestions as to what the limitations of public
policy may be. But while it is probably impossible and certainly un-
wise to try to announce a priori all conceivable policies which might be
implicated by party modifications of the rules, certain major themes
are nevertheless identifiable and worth stating.
25. The facts of the illustration are taken from C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual
Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975), in which the court's holding was in
accord with the analysis advocated here. See also Garden State Plaza Corp. v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448, 457 (N.J. 1963) (suggesting that many decisions
voiding consensual modifications stem from "abhorrence at the substantive un-
fairness of contractual conditions for recovery").
26. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 138-143.
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A first limitation upon the parties' ability to set their own rules
would appear to be courts will not condone modes of proceeding which
defy existing ideas of rationality. Thus, it is fairly common for both
courts 27 and commentators 28 to observe that party agreements, which
resolve their disputes by resort to methods which are essentially noth-
ing more than appeals to chance will not be entertained or furthered
by the courts. And, as what might be considered a cognate principle, it
has been held that the parties may not stipulate to the contrary of
judicially noticed facts2 9 or to "facts" contradictory of those unequivo-
cally shown by the evidence. 30 An apparent justification for such a
limitation would seem to be the commonly asserted public interest in
maintaining the dignity and repute of the courts,31 which would un-
derstandably suffer from the conduct of proceedings or acceptance of
facts which were commonly viewed as irrational.
Happily, cases in which all parties agree to modes of proceeding
which, by common understanding would be irrational, are rare. They
do occur, however, and one such in southern Arizona recently served
to remind me that I had intended to look at this topic. In the Arizona
case, 32 a group holding some rather unusual beliefs brought suit for
defamation against the defendant for publicly saying that the mem-
bers of the group were "devil worshipers." Apparently, in an effort to
prove that the tenets of the group did not include devil worshiping, the
27. See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[S]hort of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a
panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want
to govern the arbitration of their disputes.").
28. See, e.g., 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 5039, at 207 ("Of course, there are
limits [to party ability to alter the rules]. Few courts would preside over an epi-
sode of trial by battle simply because both parties were agreeable.").
29. See T.L. Wright Lumber Co. v. Ripley County, 192 S.W. 996 (Mo. 1917).
30. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 243 U.S. 281 (1917); Montgomery v.
Mardis, 416 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); cf. United States v. Benally, 756 F.
2d 773 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a jury could consider evidence contradictory
to stipulation); Abendroth v. Natl Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 363 N.W.2d
785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that courts can sometimes contemplate ex-
isting evidence in addition to stipulated evidence).
31. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S.Ct. 797, 803 (1995) ("[Tlhere may be some
evidentiary provisions that are so basic to the reliability of the fact-finding pro-
cess that they may never be waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal
courts.'" (quoting 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 5, § 5039, at 207-08));
Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW &
CONTEMIP. PROBS., Autumn, 1988 at 243, 245 ("We could resolve disputes expedi-
tiously and unambiguously by tossing a coin to decide liability. Or we could sub-
mit our cases to an oracular examiner of chicken entrails. An answer would
emerge. But such decision processes would quickly erode public confidence and
would soon be abandoned.").
32. The details of the case which follow are drawn from Plaintiffs Petition for Special
Action, Church of Immortal Consciousness v. Superior Court, Arizona Court of
Appeals, Division 2, No. 2 CA-SA 94-0118.
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs proposed to call the founder of the group as an expert wit-
ness on the group's beliefs. This course of action presented certain
logistical problems since the proposed witness had been deceased
since the 15th century, and would testify, if permitted, by speaking
through one of the current leaders. Not surprisingly, the defendant
did not raise any objection.
The trial judge's reaction, however, was in my opinion entirely cor-
rect. After an initial period of disbelief that the plaintiffs were offering
the testimony of a spirit, the judge refused to allow such a proceeding.
Unfortunately, this was not the end of the matter, as the plaintiff filed
a special action in the appellate court and learned briefs were pre-
pared on the question of whether spirits can qualify as competent wit-
nesses, lay or expert, under the Arizona Rules of Evidence.
And, ultimately, the case cannot be said to represent a vindication
of the principle of judicial rationality. Upon the return of the action to
the trial court, and its trial before a different judge, the spirit was
allowed to testify. Following the testimony, and the settlement of the
case, one local attorney was quoted as observing, "this sends a very
strange message to people." 3 3 This is a comment with which I would
entirely agree.
But, as I have said, cases in which the parties wish to concur on a
matter or mode of proceeding which contravenes popular belief are
rare. Ironically, the greater danger to public respect for the rational-
ity of the judicial process may lie in judicial unwillingness to give ef-
fect to party stipulations. The outstanding example, of course, is the
polygraph or "lie detector," which has accounted for by far the greatest
number of modern cases in which courts have refused to honor party
stipulations on admissibility.3 4 I do not want to venture far into the
thicket of polygraph jurisprudence, 35 nor even to express a view on the
device's proper evidentiary status. There are clearly many cogent
questions concerning the compatibility of machine-determined credi-
bility within our judicial system.3 6 But to refuse to accept stipulated
33. Whitehouse, Spirit Testimony Raises Legal Questions, PAYSON ARIZONA
ROUNDUP, July 28, 1995, at 1. One student attending this lecture afterward
strongly urged the contention that admitting the spirit testimony was justified by
the psychological benefit to the plaintiffs achieved by impressing them with the
fairness of the procedure. Cf. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Pro-
cedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978).
34. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §7a, at 601-02 n.35 (listing cases that recognize
that virtually every state has had the opportunity to pass upon the question).
35. See 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 12, § 206, at 768 (summarizing the various
positions).
36. See, e.g., State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that ultimate justification for exclusion of stipulated polygraph results
may have nothing to do with concerns over reliability); Saks, supra note 31, at
262 ("[Plerhaps the problem [of the polygraph] is not the perceived level of inac-
curacy but rather the perceived level of accuracy.").
[Vol. 80:159
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polygraph results, as many courts have done,37 on the ground that
their stipulated admission would bring the courts into disrepute actu-
ally risks public derision at a time when wide-spread reliance on the
device is a matter of common knowledge.3 8
Let me turn now to a second type of rule which, in general, should
be immune from modification by the parties. I will call this type of
rule systemic, since rules of this type are indispensable, if not to oper-
ate any system of fact determination, at least to operate one recogniz-
able as within the Anglo-American tradition. So what am I talking
about here? Certainly not such evidentiary favorites as the hearsay
rule, or the best evidence rule, or even the concept of relevancy.3 9
These rules only serve to limit the types of grist which is to be
processed in the legal mill. They are the usual subject of waiver by
the parties, and their sacrifice causes no particular difficulty to any-
one. By contrast, rules which regulate the operational processes of the
court, which determine who decides what and by what standards, can
only be marginally modified without altering the basic character of
the proceeding or, at the very least, rendering it hopelessly ineffi-
cient.4 0 As examples of this type of rule I would suggest many of the
so-called common law powers of the court, such as the power to rule on
evidentiary sufficiency, to take judicial notice of legislative facts, and
to control the order of the proceedings.
Since time prevents a canvas of such rules, I will content myself by
considering one rule of this type which the parties sometimes elect to
modify, the rules concerning the burden of persuasion.4 1 Over the
centuries the law has developed three relatively well defined burdens
of persuasion, and their three correlative burdens of production. So
long as the parties are content to utilize one or another of these three,
even if the chosen standard is not that which the law would ordinarily
deem applicable to the particular controversy, no administrative diffi-
culties result.42 But what if the parties deliberately choose some idio-
37. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 7a, at 603 n.35 ("Courts at times appear to have re-
garded a stipulation by the parties regarding polygraphic evidence as being
roughly akin to a stipulation that the testimony of an astrologer is admissible to
establish the significance of various celestial events and conjunctions.").
38. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing data on the governmental use of the polygraph). And as this writing is
completed the FBI has just been widely criticized for not protecting its security by
greater use of the polygraph.
39. These types of rules have long been viewed as readily waivable. See Note, Con-
tracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, supra note 5.
40. See, e.g., Kardibin v. Associated Hardware, 426 A.2d 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(noting that in a civil action, parties may stipulate as they please, so long as the
stipulation neither affects the court's jurisdiction nor its convenience and
efficiency).
41. 2 McCoinucO, supra note 12, §§ 338-341, at 416-33.
42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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syncratic standard of their own? For an example, I need go no further
than the Constitution of the Order of the Coif, sponsor of this lecture,
which set the evidentiary standard for consideration for establishment
of a new chapter at a "presumptive likelihood."43 Should a court be
put to the necessity of deciphering the implications of a novel standard
of this sort? There are at least some expressions of judicial opinion
that they will not.a4
The types of limitation on party autonomy I have discussed to this
point are ones that come into play only occasionally and in special
types of situations. This is mainly because the parties do not have a
mutual interest in modifying them. There are two types of rules, how-
ever, which the parties may well share an interest in modifying.
These rules are designed to limit or condition the adversary process
itself and are rules directed toward the protection of the interests of a
non-party.
The first type of rule generally rises from a recognition that the
adversary system, despite its strengths, can occasionally lead to less
than optimum results. Where this is the case, we have tended to cre-
ate rules to fine-tune the adversary system by supplementing or re-
stricting it.45 The notion that this is an ongoing process is
demonstrated by the fact that some rules of this character are quite
old, while others are of quite recent origin.
One long-standing example of this type of rule is allowing the trial
judge to intervene and question witnesses. This is a function almost
always left to the adversaries and one highly prized by them. But this
will not infrequently occur for a variety of reasons. Mainly because
the parties are not performing the function in such a way as to bring
out the facts fully or comprehensibly, and in such cases the court has
long had the authority to supplement the witness' examination by
questions of its own.4 6 Exercise of this prerogative by the judge is, of
course, not generally welcomed by the parties, which leads to the apoc-
ryphal story of the lawyer, who, after having his questioning of wit-
nesses repeatedly interrupted by the judge's interventions, finally
approached the bench to say, "Your honor, I certainly do not object to
the court's trying this case for me, but I do have one request. Don't
lose it!" Obviously, where the concept underlying the rule is supple-
mentation of the adversary process, the option to alter the rule should
not be open to adversaries, even if done by mutual consent.
43. CONST. OF THE ORDER OF THE COIF, art. III, § 3.1(b) (amended 1985).
44. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (expressing view that parties' contractual specification for stan-
dard of judicial review of an arbitration award was permissible because "[t]he
review to which the parties have agreed is no different from that performed by
the district courts in appeals from administrative agencies").
45. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 8, at 26.
46. See FED. R. EVID. 614(b).
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An example of more recent vintage is Federal Rule of Evidence
706, which is probably the rule most generally disliked by the parties,
or at least by their lawyers, even though only a few courts invoke it
frequently. This is the rule which authorizes the trial court to appoint
expert witnesses of its own choosing, not infrequently because the ex-
perts presented by the parties are highly compensated and not at all
impartial. 47 Moreover, even those experts who make an effort to be
relatively objective in their testimony frequently feel impeded in their
efforts by the adversary process and would prefer to respond directly
to the court. Rule 705 is clearly one intended to supply an available
corrective to these deficiencies of the adversary process, and thus,
should be immune to party agreement.
A final category of rules which should not be susceptible to waiver
or modification by party agreement are rules which seek to protect the
interests of some third person or entity not a party to the proceeding
in which the rule is applicable. The most obvious example of eviden-
tiary rules of this sort are the rules of privilege, which may not infre-
quently be applicable in litigation to which the holder of the privilege
is not a party. Wigmore and others have cursorily noted that parties
A and B should not be allowed to vitiate a privilege held by C, a non-
party to their dispute.48 But though the theory is plain, the law in
this area has long been somewhat unsatisfactory. By definition, the
situation is one in which the person potentially most interested in the
enforcement of the privilege will not necessarily or even usually be
present to raise the question.49 And while a party can "suggest" the
presence of such a privilege to the court,5 0 this is not likely to be done
in situations where neither party sees an advantage in the enforce-
ment of the rule. In such an instance, as indeed in many of the in-
stances we have canvassed, the chief prospect for a correct result will
rest with the trial court. It is, however, worth underscoring that Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 103(d) as presently written does not restrict the
recognition of plain error by an appellate court to invasions of party
interests, but permits such a finding wherever a "substantial right"
has been invaded, irrespective of whether that right has been brought
to the attention of the trial court.5 1
In conclusion, I would concede that my list of policies and interests
which should limit the parties' capacity to alter or ignore the rules of
evidence is not exhaustive. No doubt the courts will continue to find
the amorphous concept of public policy useful in disapproving miscel-
laneous future party excursions in that direction. But the list I have
47. 1 McCoR ucK, supra note 12, § 8, at 30-31.
48. See, e.g., 1 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 7a, at 560.
49. 1 McCormucK, supra note 12, § 73.1, at 302.
50. See id.
51. FED. R. Evm. 103(d).
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sketched will, I think, cover a great majority of the situations likely to
arise. To recapitulate, these policies are maintaining the repute of the
judicial system by insuring that its procedures comport with contem-
porary perceptions of rationality, preserving the essential structure
and efficiency of the common law fact-finding process, enforcing rules
intended to control areas in which the parties are prone to a mutual
tendency toward partisan excess, and protecting the rights of third
persons not directly involved in the litigation.
I believe that a more specific recognition of the relatively few rules
of evidence which should remain immune from party control will per-
mit the adversary system to function with greater efficiency, as both
adversaries and trial courts can more confidently realize the bene-
fits of agreements designed to streamline and reduce the scope of
litigation.
